DIVISION COMMAND
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND
1993

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FOREWORD

The Division Command Lessons Learned Program was created to ensure those "lessons learned" by our field commanders are captured for use by current and future leaders. Since inception, the program has provided senior commander insights into our profession by selecting and compiling quotes into an annual collection of thoughts about the art and practice of command. This collection, like its predecessors, contains no "recipes," but it is a valuable point of departure for both practitioners and students of the art of command.

PAUL E. BLACKWELL
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans

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COMMAND PREPARATION

The one area that I shortchanged a little bit was my preparation on installation management. I only went one day down to Fort Lee. I should have spent a little more time there.

Your preparation for command begins 25 or 30 years earlier than that or whatever the time line happens to be. I don't think you can cram for the exam.

The most important thing I would want to do with my time is to get some assessment of the unit from the incumbents.

Make sure you have a thorough understanding of FM [Field Manual] 100-5 along with FMs 25-100 and 25-101. These three documents basically provide the cornerstone for everything that a division does -- training, maintenance, sustainment.

I think the single most surprising fact to me wasn't so much surprising. I was kind of startled as I settled in the first 90 days or so as to how well prepared I felt and I reflected on that. I think that is a credit to the officer professional development system that we have had for several years in the Army now.

Probably the area that I learned the most is the ins and outs of aviation maintenance.

It would have been very helpful to have spent some time at Fort Rucker, actually hands-on with the various aircraft, although I am not a rated aviator.

Having a personal understanding of the weapons systems that we fight with enhances your ability to command with confidence.

I thought, in general, the command preparation opportunities, the pre-command course, and the assignment pattern that I had, were very adequate.

I would sit down and pick the outgoing division commander's brain, and maybe two or three guys who he had charged with overwatching materiel readiness execution on a day-to-day basis, and certainly on training readiness. I'd look at recent JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] and NTC [National Training Center] after action reviews to try to get a sense of whether there were any substantive, recurring weaknesses.

I would also try to have an informal session with the maintenance battalion commanders.

I'd also talk with the DOL [Director of Logistics] and G4 [Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics] to get their sensing as to the overall materiel readiness. Probably the funds guy as well.

I would spend time at the JRTC and look at two or three rotations to see some of the training tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used on the execution end. I would sit in on some after action reviews from different units across different divisions to see if I could get some base line on what sort of systematic problems the units are facing. I also found sitting and spending a couple of hours with company OCs [observer-controller] and battalion OCs to get their intuitions and insights as to what units are doing well and not so well, to be an invaluable experience. If I didn't have a strong background in training management and execution, I'd visit a division with a good training program. I'd spend some time talking up and down their chain of command as to how it's working there and what are some of the ins and outs of how they are making it work.

If a commander coming in hasn't had that kind of experience, I think I would recommend that he go to a well run garrison at one of the communities of excellence. I would look not just on the Forces Command side, but I would look on the TRADOC [United States Army Training and Doctrine Command] side, too, where they have different kinds of requirements. There are some good ideas out there. I would spend a couple of days at a couple of different installations talking to what their leadership would identify as some of their best and brightest people.

An opportunity to read their latest IG [Inspector General] report, their latest performance at BCTP [Battle Command Training Program], or the combat training centers take-home package would be helpful.

I would spend a little more time on FM 100-17, which is a new doctrinal manual on deployment and mobilization, to ensure that I had a good foundation there.

I would spend some time thinking about these peacetime contingency operations. If you haven't done some thinking about urban America today and what that portends for the US Army about natural disasters -- earthquakes, hurricanes, and how you would get yourself organized for that -- then you are probably a little behind the power curve in today's world.

I would suggest you try and have some discussion with the PA&E [Program Analysis and Evaluation] at DA [Department of the Army] and try to understand how the money is spread out, who gets it, and what portion goes for training and what portion goes to quality of life.

TRAINING

I think that the division commander has to pick two or three major things that he wants to achieve, articulate those, line up his policies and resources so they all focus toward those, and then be consistent.

I think the higher up you get, the fewer things you need to select to get done and the more consistent you need to be. That's for the major muscle movements.

You need a central theme. You need a clear azimuth that lets commanders know where you are going and what is important to you. So first and foremost you say, "Most important to us to win in combat is the way that small units are going to perform, because you know they are the ones who are going to win it for us." So make sure in all your training that you keep the squads, the platoons, and the sections as your number one priority in being able to perform their doctrinal missions and being lethal.

I wouldn't rely on a lot of reports. I think it is more important that you see them perform. You have to see them in challenging situations and meeting the requirements. I would say that the greatest thing that has happened to our Army in this arena in my 30-year tenure has been the CTCs [Combat Training Center]. The CTCs clearly enforce a standard Army-wide that you don't talk about, you don't just do it at one level, but you have to put it all together.

Every ounce of energy or effort that you put into making the after action review process work, would be repaid tenfold. We have a great training system throughout the Army. Basically all that it really requires us to do is enforce what's already been codified for us.

Try to execute the BCTP early on during your tenure in command. That is an absolutely great team building exercise; it focuses you on warfighting which, needless to say, focuses you on your current state of readiness and training and how well you are maintaining. It just drives you in all the right directions.

I took elimination of training detractors on as a personal task. I reviewed every tasking coming in from a higher headquarters at the weekly division training management meeting myself.

Some of the biggest training detractors are caused by the first sergeant and the company commander.

I think that you almost have to be a zealot in search of people who are causing training detractors.

You just have to be ruthless in enforcing the 6-week training lock-in. There are a million reasons and people actually look for reasons to violate the lock-in.

At the heart of the light forces capability is the ability to deploy on short notice. That starts off with a good plan or a good readiness SOP [standing operating procedure]. But it has to be exercised regularly and, in my opinion, with no notice. No one likes surprises. Many people will try to talk you out of these no notice, bolt out of the blue, type exercises. I think it is important that you have a program that is based on no notice if you have an 18-hour sequence for deployment. Otherwise, you can very easily be lulled into a false sense of security.

It's the division training calendar and allocation of resources at the division level that sets the framework in which brigade commanders and battalion commanders can train. You can put out all kinds of training objectives and guidance, but if you haven't set the framework and resources, and allocated time and the training areas and all of that, subordinate commanders can work toward those goals, but they can never really achieve them. They will be consistently frustrated.

The single most important thing that I have said and done in the division is to insist on training leaders first.

Another thing we have done locally is the introduction of sergeants' time on Thursdays, five consecutive hours worth. The noncommissioned officer, section leader, and squad leader has his soldiers for uninterrupted time to train on those things that the sergeant knows his soldiers need to be trained on.

I instituted a program which goes through a series of training lanes starting at platoon through task force and brigade level, to include fire control exercises, command field exercises, as well as CALFEXs [Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises]. The other point that I make is that maintenance is training, and training is maintenance.

If you are going to have a Total Army concept, and if you are going to put more reliance on the Reserves, you damn well better make sure you know where they are before you start training them. It is expensive in time, people, and dollars, but I guess my point is, how can you not afford to do it?

They had this thing called the Bold Shift packet that was laid out for all different types of units. The TRADOC guys with Forces Command, developed it.

There was a lot of misconception and there still is on Bold Shift about, well, you can only train at squad and platoon level. That is wrong. We did staff exercises at the brigade level. We did staff exercises at the battalion level. We issued the order. They had to give us orders. We did rock drills. That was the collective staff training going on while we were doing individual squad and platoon level training. It was a good exercise.

Training is the Army's number one priority. A division commander has to say that frequently and you have to believe it. You also have to make other people believe it. The priorities that you set on a day-to-day basis, whatever they are, have to reflect the fact that training is the number one priority.

Be prepared to go with the 80 or 90 percent solution.

The center of gravity for that whole thing is the company training meeting.

If you make training central to all things, then all things either contribute to it, inhibit it, or coexist in a compatible way.

Commanders have to spend a lot of time creating the conditions in which quality training can occur. Quality training is defined as that training that has the highest carryover skills and the highest possible retention for warfighting.

Underlining all training efforts is the notion about safety and risk.

The way to get safe conditions is to talk a lot about training and about what you are going to do, and spend a lot of time making sure that the plan at each level is a safe plan.

I think the safest units are the most proficient units and that is totally unrelated to how much commanders talk about safety.

You have to have enough guts to resist the temptation to simulate everything.

You have to be fairly skilled in understanding what a simulation will or will not do in terms of exposure, teaching, and retention of training tasks to whatever level. You have to use simulations as an adjunct or a support or part of a smorgasbord of training, and not kid yourself into believing that you are training when you use nothing but that approach.

I allowed a democratic interface or led a democratic interface to get all of the battle focusing business on the table and used that as a technique to organize our work.

I go around each battalion and sit down with the company commanders and first sergeants over a meal and try to learn what they perceive to be the training detractors.

I gave guidance in the training guidance, checked it at the QTB [Quarterly Training Brief], but I never really prescribed what they had to teach or what the subject ought to be.

It is important in this division whenever you go to train that the soldiers have MILES [Multiple Integrated LASER Engagement Simulation] equipment; that we have an OPFOR [opposing force]; that we have observer controllers; that, whatever training we are doing, it is either live fire or leading up to live fire; and that we do it at night.

DOCTRINE

Army doctrine under FM 100-5 probably has a comfort level with me and most of my contemporaries greater than any time in my 30 years in the Army. You could talk it from corps commander down through squad leader, and everybody knew and understood the doctrine. That has not always been the case. In fact, when I first joined the Army, that was not the case at all. Frequently, people of foreign armies knew and understood our doctrine better than we did in those days. That is not the case now. We know and understand Army doctrine, and we are comfortable with it.

I have found that joint doctrine is not codified very well. We are neophytes in really capturing joint doctrine, and it loses a lot in the broad and consequently vague principles. For example, you may believe that Army and USMC [United States Marine Corps] doctrine on defense are the same, or at least very close to being the same, from reading the manuals. Yet, when you set a Marine unit side by side with an Army unit (like we did in DESERT SHIELD), lo and behold, they execute the defense differently, and there is a great danger of seeing a flank open 25 kilometers in a short time span.

Joint and combined doctrine is the wave of the future. I guess the thing I would urge our Army to do is lead and assist the other services to join us in a joint doctrine that serves us well in combat. After you establish the doctrine in a joint arena, then comes the training piece of how you enforce, teach, and coach the people to use the doctrine.

I am happy to note that most officers are getting a good dose of training doctrine in the school system. But I'm surprised still by the number of senior NCOs [noncommissioned officer] who take over as first sergeants, especially in noncombat arms, who don't know FM 25-100 and FM 25-101.

I guess what is most important for us, that I am least comfortable with, is the joint doctrine. How do I know that I am going to get the CAS [close air support] that I really need? How do I know the CAS rules and the deep fight rules that I am comfortable with are going to be used by the Air Force? My experience in Southwest Asia indicated that I shouldn't take that for granted. The Air Force will use different rules in a heartbeat because that is not doctrine yet to them. The only thing that the Army and the Air Force have clear doctrine agreement on is the FSCL [fire support coordination line]. They don't have anything else clear on how we control the deep battle.

I would honestly devote time to finding out what the new threat was. Should we continue to have these BCTPs against the Soviet Combined Arms Armies and should we continue at CMTC [Combat

Maneuver Training Center] together with some regional operations or some threats in scenarios that might look like Europe or like Korea?

The Army doesn't have a deployment doctrine. One of the most critical tasks on our mission essential task list is to deploy the division on short notice to an immediate staging base with the expectation that we'll do a force lodgement at some location. There really is no doctrine for all of that that's written down. That is a doctrinal void.

I would also say there is a doctrinal void on redeployment operations as we saw coming back from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. I know there is a pretty big effort underway right now to get redeployment doctrine out.

I found it necessary to teach doctrine, to discuss it at every warfighter and every CPX [command post exercise] we had. I think that it is important that all the subordinates understand how you think about warfighting and how you envision the doctrine being applied. It helps them get inside of your intent and gives them a sense of, a generic notion of, how you are going to fight the division.

I think for a division commander to be conversant with corps level doctrine is important. A division is certainly different from a brigade. But it's a lot more similar to a brigade than a division is to a corps, with all the moving parts and all the capabilities that are attendant to a corps. That's especially true in contingency operations, where a corps may be serving jointly as a joint task force headquarters, as well as providing the command and control for a division or multiple divisions underneath it.

We only have the ability to project my voice and some data over unlimited distances. I cannot instantly bring up in front of the eyes of a subordinate a map and sketch out some possible plays like the sportscasters do in reviewing a play that has just been executed on NFL [National Football League] football.

We've done an awful lot with what I call the ACT [Artillery Combat Team] as a package that goes forward, in front of my maneuver brigades, with protection. It goes as deep as I can possibly get them, so that it can reach out and touch somebody. I take cannon and rocket as deep as I can.

We must know more about the peace keeping doctrine and the contingency operations.

We are really thin on how we are going to deal with multinational forces.

I believe that FMs 25-100 and 25-101 have it just about right in terms of technique. So I believe it is important that you hold everyone to that system and that you not reward or reinforce ad hocery. I don't like ad hocery in either doctrinal things, or techniques, or training management, or any of the other facets of how we do our business. I think you can work for an entire career as hard as you possibly can adhering to doctrine.

I personally believe that our recon business is busted. Busted in equipment, technique, and intent, and I think that you get some command notions that are wrong. The notion of how we use our intel assets, what we expect from them, and how that's deployed on the battlefield, is something that I have tried to solidify, at least with this division on how that is going to happen. It is pretty much as it says in the book it ought to happen.

There is still one body of doctrine that is emerging that we haven't gotten tacked down, and that is how you use attack battalions in heavy divisions.

ORGANIZATION

I think the first thing you have to know and understand is what is essential to you for mid-intensity conflict or even the high end of the low-intensity conflict and the resources you get from corps. They are essential for the METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available] analysis.

Forward support battalions are the right way to go.

You can't lose a lot of people in a light infantry division and have the same effectiveness. It is sort of right on the margin. That is on the margin not just in DISCOM [division support command], not just in aviation maintenance, not just in TOW [tubed-launched optically tracked, wire command-link guided missiles] companies, but across the board you are sort of on the margin in terms of depth except for your infantry squads.

I would urge the Army leadership to revisit the light infantry division structure. I think the incoming and outgoing division commanders have that responsibility. As we look to fewer divisions, we have to look to more capable divisions. Now there will be naysayers who say that the most important thing that the light infantry divisions bring is their deployability. I disagree with the fact that if you give me more equipment, I will become less deployable. I would tell you from the METT-T factor, that you pick and choose and take what you need.

I think that is the way you tailor your deployments in the future of a CONUS [Continental United States] based Army. METT-T drives the decision, not your organizational structure.

What we really need is a scout proficiency course where they go find a bunch of things. They might have to shoot their gun now and then but mostly they get scored for something other than that.

Every time you attempt to work outside of your established MTOE [Modification Table of Organization and Equipment], you get into all kinds of ancillary problems. Such as the property book not matching what the now two different organizations have on hand so property accountability becomes a problem. You get into individuals working in different UICs [unit identifier code], or all kinds of little annoyances that on the surface appear to be easy, but they don't work that well because our system is not geared to ad hoc organizations. We have really resisted doing anything on an ad hoc basis unless absolutely necessary.

One thing that has jumped out at me though, is the overstructuring of the aviation brigade in terms of the inability to sustain and the inability to maintain, if you will. It has

really put a burden on the maintainers to try to maintain the operational tempo and keep the OR [operational readiness] rates up. That needs to be fixed.

If we were going to do night assaults into difficult and demanding LZs [landing zones] and PZs [pick up zones], we really had to have the second enlisted crew member on the Black Hawk. Currently under our authorizations, we have the two pilots required and one crew chief required, but not the second one. We require this for safety and control, mounting and dismounting procedures, and to provide the experience factor needed.

We invested in diagnostic equipment and some additional people in our Director of Logistics to help us fix as much GS [general support] level maintenance stuff as we could.

I am dead set against special organizations unless absolutely necessary. With the downsizing of the Army and with the reduction in the budget, I have made a strong effort to get our specialized combat service support units involved in supporting our installation.

We got the tanks back in the division cavalry squadron which was good because the cavalry squadron has a guard mission. You can't guard without tanks, so I was glad to see that.

We have enhanced our scout platoons both at the battalion and brigade level with HMMWVs [high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle] and that has been a help, and we also have motorcycles now in the organization.

This ability to take slice elements and divide them by three has become more and more important in order to develop habitual relationships so you can train as brigade task forces.

Force modernization is first and foremost a training issue.

If you don't have the commanders involved in training for force modernization, you are going to get up some day and look around, and you are going to have all of this stuff that you cannot make work effectively.

I think what you need at the outset is a good management system at division level for all resources. You have to figure out how you are going to manage the division's resources. I chose to do that in five globs. I did it in a training management glob; in a maintenance and logistics management glob; in a dollars/budgetary management glob; in a garrison operations glob; and the last glob was sort of a review and analysis of the individual indicators that have to do with individual services.

I think that it was a smart idea to go from Bradleys to HMMWVs in scout platoons in the battalions and the division. I think we ought to have an Echo Company and it probably should be under armor.

I am looking at taking the Bradleys that the HMMWVs free up in the scout platoon and give them to Echo companies.

EQUIPMENT

My biggest concern was the austerity of the MTOE; the fact that there was no redundancy in our equipment levels.

One of the smartest things that was ever done was to pure fleet the 5-ton trucks. I didn't have multiple types of 5-tons to maintain because we only had one type. It was brilliantly done.

I guess the only lesson you really draw is that in a light infantry organization, the structure is one deep. Every piece of equipment that is authorized is needed as a premium. When you have a shortage, it can cause severe problems that you won't recognize until you get in an FTX [field training exercise] or on a battlefield.

I think the most important thing that you want to follow in the introduction of new equipment is, don't hurry it and use the system of full fielding. Make sure that you don't field unless you get everything that comes with it. That includes the manuals, the spare parts, and the training package.

You have to have the PLL [prescribed loading list] and the ASL [authorized stockage list] as part of the package. So it goes. Full package fielding is essential.

Our depots are going to have trouble surviving.

Force modernization and reorganization have a momentum of their own.

We arrived back here with tremendous amounts of excesses. Many requisitions we dropped in the desert and we attempted to cancel en route back, came pouring in.

Nothing has been as frustrating to me as attempting to maintain a 75 percent aviation OR rate. The DESERT STORM damage to the aircraft, keeping a number of them in the STIR [Surplus to Immediate Requirements] program and then attempting to maintain the crew proficiency and, more importantly, the combat readiness as a team, have all been in competition with keeping the aircraft up at a DA goal of 75 percent.

To solve excesses after the desert required a full-fledged attack. The worst thing of all is trying to beat up the poor supply sergeant when you haven't given him an expedient way to turn in those excesses once they have been identified.

The Army system right now, from my perspective, appears to have fielding of new equipment down pat.

I am required to augment my staff with a force modernization shop just to keep it all on track and to make sure we are meeting the milestones laid out for us as part of the whole process.

The FAIS [FORSCOM Automated Intelligence System] computer system, is a poor man's piece of intelligence equipment which compliments TENCAP [Tactical Exploitation of National Space Capabilities]. The FAIS system allows the G2 [Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence] to track enemy units and to keep an enemy data base loaded. He can call those up on a screen with a map behind it. He can apply a filter if he just wants to look at air defense units; he can just look at artillery units; he can look at all units; and he can put on several different kinds of filters and bring up information that he wants. In addition, he can put the cursor on a particular unit and then call up the file on that unit, and it will tell us everything that we've collected on that unit to that point. Although it's designed as an intelligence collection and monitoring system, we are looking at merging that capability so I can simultaneously look at red and blue units and store blue information spot reports in much the same fashion. Then it becomes a matter of just having to transmit that signal out of that computer to a television monitor in the division TOC [tactical operations center], or maybe subordinate units TOC over MSE [mobile subscriber equipment] lines, or however we could do that.

My cavalry squadron was the blindest of my aviation outfits. With OH-58Cs and Cobras, they were less capable than the Apaches that scouted for them.

There is no cookie-cutter formula that you can use for any item other than to say you have to make it a matter of command priority on the front-end. Sit down and look at the nature of the item of equipment, which part of the organization is going to man it, and then METT-T your training program to fit the situation based on the item of equipment.

The biggest issues, both for the Active and the Reserves, are radios, cargo capability, and some of the TMDE [test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment] and night vision systems which are just short throughout the Army and present real concerns about our capability to go to war.

I would just say not to take any shortcuts from the way the system is laid out.

It is PMCS [preventive maintenance checks system] -- leaders, soldiers, and drivers training programs. Those are the first links in the whole chain of maintenance and equipment readiness. What you find is that maintenance, training, and the licensing procedures that are within your division are important to you. We are not doing this as well as we could.

The operators and their supervisors were saying that the ULLS [unit logistics system] doesn't work, the software is not right, or the hardware doesn't work. But what we found out was that they had just simply lost confidence in the system because they had not been properly trained upfront.

I would say that the equipment issues associated with modernizing the division were the ones that got my attention early on.

READINESS

What I don't think we do particularly well is measure execution to standard.

When you are reporting out your readiness for war, realize that you would probably like to get out and try a couple of things a couple of times before you say ready.

I think, first of all, if the individual coming into command is not imminently familiar with AR [Army Regulations] 220-1, in terms of the requirements for readiness reporting, certainly that is the key document that he needs to get very familiar with. You have the training readiness, the maintenance readiness, but you also have the soldier readiness, both his physical and mental readiness. That relates to the family support groups and the family care programs.

As we become a contingency Army you have to be very concerned about your ability to deploy and meet your deployability requirements, which is a key part of your readiness. So you really get into deployability, training, maintenance, and taking care of soldiers, along with sustaining a division and how well you are prepared to do that.

We spent a lot of time focusing on how we were recovering from DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Around the first of August I said, "Okay, we are finished recovering from DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Now we are preparing for the next war."

We initiated the maintenance terrain walk which was my mechanism for doing the leader development at the battalion commander level. I found this in previous unit experiences very helpful in ensuring a high knowledge level on the part of the right leaders to get a high achievement level in maintenance.

Again, the post DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM situation. Highest priority, of course, was the aviation maintenance. I think the biggest issue was not knowing exactly where we stood but the extent of the damage and all it incurred. We got teams from AVSCOM [United States Army Aviation Systems Command]. AVSCOM provided an engineer on-site who stayed here all the time.

I felt that the MSU (Major Subordinate Unit) commanders were not working hard enough within their "lane" to fix, especially personnel problems, those issues within their capability to fix. In some cases, equipment problems could be solved by simply laterally transferring one piece of equipment to another unit within the same MSU and bringing that unit from C4 to C3 by the action of the MSU commander.

I asked that the [RC] Brigade commander attend every monthly USR [unit status readiness], although his report is submitted on a quarterly basis.

The National Guard brigade commander and some of his staff -- normally two or three staff members -- participated in the monthly commanders' conference so they got to see what we do and how we do it, so there were not two sets of standards.

Each month after we got finished with the USR, I sent out a "Personal For" message to the TAPCA [Total Army Personnel Center Agency] and normally to EPD [Enlisted Personnel Directorate], because that is where all the problems tend to be, and say, "Here are my problems. This is what I am trying to do to fix them. What are you trying to do to help me?" Normally, I inform my next immediate boss, the Corps commander, as well as the J1 [Personnel Directorate] at Forces Command.

The biggest uncertainty is the amount of dollars and cents tied up in this new SFDLR [Stock Level Depot Level Repairables] process. We have to make sure that we don't pay for unnecessary replacements. It has tightened up our management of dollars to do maintenance and repair.

Deployability is the primary area where I feel that there was some work that needed to be done and we just rolled up our sleeves and did it.

Folks who have been in heavy divisions for their whole lives, or primarily have served in Europe, don't have a clear understanding of what is required in deployment readiness and the training that has to go into that. There is a tremendous training piece with respect to deployability readiness.

By simply looking at the master training calendar, we found that we had not conducted for quite awhile a division LOADEX [Loading Exercise] -- to load up the whole division and look at our pallets.

I had desert wear, I had war wear, and I had "slicky boy" wear that required us to do a rapid focus and make a decision. The question was, given that so much of the equipment was in less than great shape, do we focus on the maintenance piece to the exclusion of training, or do we go back into a balanced maintenance and training program and therefore perhaps take a little bit longer to get all of that equipment back to some magical number, whatever that number was to be?

We made the decision to go into a balanced maintenance and training program.

I live and work in the III Corps and in Forces Command and I have not had one iota of pressure from either of those places to falsify reports, to be more optimistic in reports than I wanted to be, or to do anything at all other than report precisely the status of readiness.

A systemic problem that has been around for a long time is the TOEs [Tables of Organization and Equipment] which are just a little out-of-date all the time. That means you have to really hustle to keep your perceived readiness accurate.

Commanders prefer to think of themselves as better trained than they actually may be.

Probably the most serious problem we have in the personnel business, which impacts directly on maintenance and training, is shortage of key aviation MOSs [military occupational specialty]. We are getting to the point where I am beginning to be concerned about flying safety. We are working our maintainers so hard and we are asking them to do so much, a combination of unscheduled maintenance, phases, and everything else, that I think we are getting spread a little thin.

FIELD OPERATIONS

Why is it that I can't mechanically reproduce orders and overlays at battalion level? It is crazy. It is because the Army hasn't focused on that problem for light infantry.

One technique that we use is a regularly scheduled conference call with all of the commanders. We would go around the horn quickly in a conference call fashion so that they could all hear each other in cross talk. That little technique kept us synchronized to focus on the right thing.

Maintain a good, strong command post exercise program. Unless you drive it, everyone below you will let it go because it is hard and it takes a lot of work and effort from every one on the team.

Attempt to have a quarterly command post exercise where all three division command posts will be set up in a field environment and will communicate. Have the MSC [major subordinate command] down to separate battalion headquarters set up in the field as well. If you don't, the turnover of people semiannually will just eat you up.

I think our maneuver control process is fundamentally archaic. I think it is entirely possible to electronically create and transmit maps, overlays, explicit reports, quick tactical notions, almost to the point that you would be calling them as an audible on the line of scrimmage.

I also try to transmit multiple ideas (branches and sequels) through multiple means so that everybody has a few of these sketched on butcher paper pads in their TOC.

We completed an exercise with Fort Hood through distributed simulation from Fort Carson to Fort Hood. It was an excellent exercise. There are some disadvantages, but the advantages are in the savings of dollars and cents and the ability to multi-echelon training at Fort Carson while participating in a Fort Hood driven exercise.

With the dollars and cents available nowadays, you are just not able to put this division in the field.

The MSE tends to take away the cross-talk ability you gain when you use FM [frequency modulated] radio.

I am planning what I would call a division HMMWVEX [High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Exercise] in the future because one of my METL [mission essential task list] statements says to move the division.

All of the levels up through battalion have repetitive training opportunities. If you don't watch it, a division commander, particularly if he is on a one-division installation, becomes at best, the exercise director, and at worst, the guy who provides resources to the exercise director. Unless you really find some way to do business, you are just not going to have the chance to train yourself to warfight. You have to make opportunities. How do you make opportunities at that level? You just have to go out and find major exercises that people are willing to have you participate in and also have the money for you to participate.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The command group in the division teaches. Myself and the ADCs [Assistant Division Commander], the division sergeant major, and the chief of staff, all teach. Train the leaders first and everything else will fall in its natural order.

I've set up warfighting seminars once a quarter. Those are battle focused warfighting seminars that literally talk about how the division fights -- how I as the commander intend to fight this division.

We do off site about every 6 months with the senior leaders and then I try to do a division staff ride with senior leaders about once every 6 months.

We have not done a good job with brigade battle staffs and that is where we needed the most professional development.

Where I think we need the most professional development is in the training of battle staffs, a battle command training program.

Professional development at most levels is a good AAR [after action report].

OPD [Officer Professional Development] and NCOPD [Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development] requires having the courage to establish systems that say when a person is selected for a school, he or she gets to go to it. Even if you are going to the NTC, even if you are needed to deploy, even if you need X, Y, or Z, you have to establish a policy that underwrites investment in our future. Sometimes it is painful.

I think there is still a need for a considerable number of post schools that are Army sanctioned but not Army invested. For instance, company commanders and first sergeants need to be trained to some extent before they take command. Senior NCOs need a refurbishing course when they first arrive in a mechanized division.

I would be the last guy to say you ought to set up a monthly requirement at battalion level on a QTB [quarterly training brief] for a speakers program or whatever the approach might be, and then grade people on whether or not they have done that. I think that is a grading process and not a product. You have to determine what people need in terms of enrichment or continuing education or training, and then provide that.

There are very few people selected for ADC-S who are trained for that position when they arrive. It requires a considerable amount of work, study, and creating terms of reference. It is also a marvelous educational position for any general officer.

The feedback that we are getting from the skill development test from our NCOs is that there is still an awful lot of work to do at the squad leader level and the platoon sergeant level on their understanding of FM 25-101.

FAMILY ACTION

A soldier needs to know that if he is going to war, his family is going to be provided for.

You have to have a credible rear detachment with a good officer, a good NCO, a good wife chain, good telephone numbers, good medical care, good wills and powers of attorney, and all of that.

I think the greatest family issue or challenge that we've had in this command, has been basically trying to keep the families informed. We've solved that to some degree thanks to help from the Army recently with the mailing privileges for the official mail. Getting information out to family members is extremely important to make them feel that they are a part of it. They really want to know.

Family members that feel like they are a part of the team and understand that the unit cares about them are a great asset.

I think it is important that a general officer addresses and welcomes every single individual coming into the division each week. Likewise, I also say farewell to all those soldiers who are leaving the Army weekly. We make certain that they are given their Army service pin, give them a Certificate of Achievement from the division, and provide them with a free one-year membership in the division association.

I think we have three great needs. One is adequate, available, and affordable family housing. Then related to that is child care and cost associated with that. Then the third issue is availability of health care in the family practice setting for all of our families.

You should participate actively in your Family Action Program Symposium process. You should be sure that you are getting regular updates once the issues are raised in a public forum and that the community is aware of the actions that you have taken to solve issues.

It is a system of taking what we call vans out to visit the outlying neighborhoods, spend time trying to get family members involved, and getting them to come to the Outreach Centers. It is an opportunity for the workers on the van to help with family money matters, to talk to them about the care of children, and to teach them other ways to save money through food preparation, etc.

As a part of the Outreach program, we also do seminars for the wives in the battalions. It is an opportunity to discuss problems that they are having and to learn about agencies here on post that are here to help families with their concerns.

I routinely have meetings with the locals. I try to support social events and other areas and talk with them about issues.

LEADERSHIP

One of the things I do is an annual azimuth check. I use that annual platform to talk to the new team. I really talk in terms of how I do business so that they know and understand and aren't surprised by how I approach training, how I approach maintenance, how I approach leader development, and how I approach taking care of soldiers and families.

You have to listen, and listening may be one of your most important leadership skills that you have at a higher level.

The most important thing that the division commander does from a leadership standpoint is to set the vision for the division, set the azimuth. You have to have a vision of where you are headed and you have to be consistent and not waiver. Yes, you have to adjust things along the way and pick things up on the left and right, but you have to have a clear vision of how you are going to fight the division and train it to fight. The division commander has to provide that from a leadership standpoint. It doesn't bubble up from someone else, and you don't let the staff do that one for you.

Giving clear intent and clear guidance is a tough academic intellectual drill. But once you have done it, and you are willing to stand back, I have always been surprised by how much better they did it than I thought they would.

Be yourself, listen, and mentor.

You can afford, at that point, to be a little less directive in nature and more philosophical, and you'll achieve the same results. You don't have to rule with an ironclad fist as you sometimes find down at the lower level where guys just don't have the experience or the necessary good judgment.

They expect to see you lead from the front and that's a common thing I found from company all the way through division.

The most significant leadership concern was establishing what I wanted to have as the command climate within the division. I am not sure if you ask me to define command climate that I could give you a good definition. But we all recognize it when we see it. In my opinion, it was establishing a climate in which the people felt good about what they were doing, they enjoyed being a part of the organization, they did not feel threatened, and they liked being part of the team. I think the things that I attempted to do early on as part of that, were to establish an attitude of openness, being honest and candid with subordinates at every level, making sure that I praised people for doing a good job, and trying to hone in on the positive aspects of things that were going on.

After assuming command we had an off post management conference which involved the leadership of the division from the command sergeant major right up to the lieutenant colonel level and above and the primary staff and special staff. That turned out to be a tremendous team building exercise.

It was a 2 and 1/2-day session and it was held in the local area but off the installation. We had the wives join us at lunch that day, and then they had a program in the afternoon addressing the family care programs and what have you. They had several lecturers that came to talk about the hospital system on post and gateway to health and things of that type.

The most important trait is someone who enforces standards, is hard on people who don't measure up to the standard, but is also compassionate enough to know that there are reasons why people don't get there, and is not hard on his people from a personal standpoint.

I think the key is that when you find a problem, the commander that has the problem doesn't automatically assume he is going to be the next victim at the hanging.

One of the greatest challenges that I had as a division commander is staying in control of my calendar, rather than have that calendar control me. If you let it try to float or manage itself, you'll find that there are about three times as many people at all levels trying to get in and take your time, and it will leave you with no time to get out to the most important thing you do, and that's seeing how you are doing at the warfighting business.

A two-star note for a job well done is a powerful motivator. It is amazing to me that in a 15,000 person division, there are thousands of troops out there that never get a chance to talk to a general officer much less the division commander.

Everyone in the top box will certainly help the command climate. But basically it abrogates your responsibility as a senior rater in terms of the larger Army system.

I put a lot of faith in quiet excellence. A competent, confident leader, who insists that his subordinate units and soldiers meet high standards, and who is able to achieve those without a lot of chest beating and all of that, is probably the guy you are going to find is cool and collected under fire. That leader is not wasting his soldiers' energy on unnecessary things but going right to the heart of the mission and getting the job done.

Policies and procedures that get written over time become mutually contradictory. The young sergeant and the young

lieutenant out there trying to draw the ammunition or get the range open or whatever it may be. They may find they have six different directives to sort out. They can't possibly do all the things that have been defined for them to do, so they start compromising. The obligation that we have is to smoke through that periodically, to run audits, and to try to make things user-friendly. We have to avoid setting up an environment where, down at the worker bee level, guys have to selectively noncomply to get the mission accomplished in a safe and reasonable way.

Sometimes you really have to keep your mouth shut and just avoid being too vocal, or you get people stirring when you don't want them to stir.

If you use a very solid commander's intent then you can overcome an awful lot of the unknowns, as I call them, because everyone understands your intent and you've been very specific about it. I tend to want to go eyeball to eyeball so every commander can understand my inflection, my body language, and everything else when I talk about the matters at hand. When we depart, subordinate commanders know precisely what I want done and when I want it done.

I assess a person to determine whether he or she is a credible teacher and trainer of subordinates. They must be able to teach and train subordinates.

I would say the biggest thing that I have learned is a new philosophy that says, "I will need to work hard at making people successful under me."

You need to be visible; fight to get out and about; be available and make sure your people know you are available.

Never withhold anything that you are feeling because they will never know and you end up with a reputation of having a hidden agenda. I don't have any hidden agendas.

Clearly you are in the prioritization business. You have tools available to you for doing that kind of prioritization. The annual training guidance and the quarterly training guidance are excellent tools to use. You have to think your way through the process. If you are too specific and give too much guidance, it can drive people nuts, and that is not good. If you are too general, people don't know what is important.

One of the best ways to judge the combat success or failure of a subordinate is to watch him around his soldiers. You can tell if a leader really cares about his soldiers.

Even if a commander is what we would call a "tough commander," you can find soldiers who will just love him for that kind of tough love because they know he truly cares about them.

You just have to be yourself. If you aren't, people will figure that out in about three minutes. Then you are tabbed as a phony.

You have to have the willingness to put yourself in front. Accept risk and not be afraid of failure because there will be failures.

I have always believed, and I truly believe now, that continuity between commanders and honoring the previous commander for his or her efforts, are a must. You have to get your head sort of squared away that the unit -- its history and its heritage and what it does -- is the most important thing. Even the commanders are servants of that unit. This is no ones division.

I think worrying about turf and whose turf you are on is a terminal waste of time. It brands you as a small or petty person.

Listen to your own folks first. That's team building. Let them have the benefit of the doubt that you trust their abilities and what they are doing. Then if you don't like the odor of what you are doing, go to the special place and figure it out. Take that commander with you so you can all pursue truth and honesty and the American way at one time.

There are a lot of things that a 51-year old person probably can get away with not doing, particularly one who is a major general. I think you have to avoid falling into that syndrome, which means you have to go to PT [physical training] when there is PT, and if someone says, "Let's go run a race," you have to do that. Not only do you have to run it, but you have to do well in it. Leadership is a pretty basic thing to me. It is a combination of some rather complex management skills and systems, a good battle focus sampling, and then putting yourself in a visible position, and making sure that when you do that, you are not going to have a negative impact because you can't do what you set out to do.

Give them logic, tell them what to do, give them space to be all they can be to do their business, and then check on it. When it is wrong, tell them; when it is right, reward them.

I don't think a division commander can rank order lives or directly influence company commanders. I don't think he can command more than about one echelon except when he has to do certain things with battalion commanders.

I think the best way to do this business is by modelling; having the patience to explain what you are doing. If you try to be all things to all people, you'll lose your subordinates because they will wait for you to make a decision. A brigade commander in the Army today is a war lord. You certainly do not want that person waiting for you to make a decision nor do you want his subordinates looking to the division commander for leadership guidance or decisionmaking.

There are folks who just come to the fore in combat situations who, I perceive, to be average or only a little above average peacetime performers. To some, the sounds of the guns are sort of like a fire Klaxon to a dalmatian. I've never come to grips with the predictive nature of that.

In gross terms, and particularly with the higher level commanders who are involved with sophisticated synchronization tasks, confidence and competence are generally the indicators that it is going to work.

You haven't got time to deal with ambition if you are going to do your lane well. General Sullivan says, "Work your lane."

As a commander, what you can do to build the right climate is to take every opportunity to not create double standards. That is, what's good for Private X is good for the division commander. Now I haven't been perfect in that and certainly don't get it right all the time, but you really should have that kind of an approach. Simple stuff like taking the PT test, taking a physical, weighing yourself -- getting on the scale. If you tell someone that you are going to play a basketball game, show up and do it, and on and on. If you are supposed to qualify with a weapon, go do that.

You have to be demonstrative in your ability of handling failure. Probably in the last 10 years all of us have probably said we must underwrite failure. Honest mistakes will not be killers. Nobody trusts that until you have demonstrated it. I'd say look for a failure or two. There is always enough around to consider and then demonstrate your ability to underwrite that. Now I would caution that there is a difference between failure and lawlessness, and a difference between failure and breaches in good order and discipline.

Somebody senior to you in a position that is perceived as influential or threatening by your subordinates comes to town and asks a tough question, you answer it. Don't ever let one of your subordinates hang out in the wind. If it is liable to be a good deal, if everything you have is going well, put one of your subordinates out there.

Except in exceptional cases, I handle it by exclusion. If I find a problem where there is an ethical crisis, if I can find it before the guy or gal goes down, I try to intervene and do something about it.

The only time I get punitively disgusted with someone is when he or she has demonstrated incompetence, or lack of integrity, or a failure in one of those basic principles.

There is a command responsibility in setting environments that are open and mutually trusting that are not "got you" drills.

Be careful that you don't try to be the best brigade commander in the division.

I think the CTC model is a good way of assessing your leaders. If they are unable to learn from mistakes made and things that went wrong, and all of that, through the AAR, the retraining process, then they are going to have trouble. I think that resolve and tenacity are two things you have to look for in your leaders, and the inability to grow, to learn, and to improve is probably something that is important to watch out for.

I would tell them to take the job seriously but not yourself. To lighten up and try to get to know your subordinate commanders.

ETHICS

The ethical climate is set by the division commander. Don't expect anybody else in the division to set the climate. Your responsibility is to set the ethical climate.

We have to be concerned about ethics and even overly concerned about ethics. You need to be very upfront, I think, with your commanders from day one in terms of where you come from in the area of ethics.

If you don't provide an atmosphere in which individuals know that they can bring or surface problems to you, and in which you deal with them from what they are -- a problem -- rather than your going after a head every time something goes wrong, you are going to end up with more ethics problems. That's particularly true when it comes to reporting and trying to bring things out in the open to deal with them. Trying to cover it up or wish it would go away won't solve anything.

I would recommend that a new commander articulate his ethical standards very clearly right upfront so that everyone understands where he is coming from, what the standards are, and what the expectations are. Then if there are violations or indiscretions, they are very quickly and promptly investigated. Then you move to take the appropriate action as you deem necessary. At that point you have no reason to be concerned about whether you have failed to let your subordinates know what the standard was or anything of that nature. You can deal with it.

He never beat up a subordinate with his hands but did so verbally. That begins to border on ethical behavior, I think.

Your role model is a powerful influence on the division. You need to talk about it but let the preaching be done by how you behave, not what you say.

We don't live in a zero defect environment. If you have something which you call a zero defect program or imply that it is, you are creating an ethical problem for yourself.

Perceptions are absolutely real. You can't change somebody's perception. So you have to be on guard all the time and almost conduct yourself in a way where you are not only being ethically correct, but you go out of your way not to cause someone to have the perception that you are doing something wrong.

I maintained that by being sure that I set a tone that did not convey any desire on my part for form over substance, or for statistics, or other of the false measures of success that tend to drive people out to the fringes of ethical behavior.

I think the readiness reporting system, if it is not carefully monitored, can work against an ethical climate because every commander wants his unit to be as ready as it can be.

I told my people that we report what happens exactly, and then we assess it, we don't shade it, and we don't gild it, whether it is coming up to us or whether it is going from us to somebody else.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

I guess the biggest thing to me was the demand on your time between the competing requirements of trying to see what the division is doing and also trying to sort out what the installation was doing.

Shortfalls that are very clear but hard to sell are things like warehouses. Warehouses are not glamorous, but we only have 5 percent of the warehouse requirement for this post.

I would agree that you need a high quality garrison commander and staff to run a garrison well. I think the US Army does not pay proper attention to the installation side of running the Army.

I think you have to have a proponent for garrison and installation at the Department of the Army level that looks out after running garrisons. I think the Air Force does that much better than we do. There is a system growing up in the Air Force where you manage and run bases. That is an alternative way of success in that service. I think it can be that way in the Army.

The management skills needed at installation level are not the same as running a battalion and division. So you need an alternative way of growing up in the Army.

The information for how to run an installation is available. The US Army has it. It is being taught right now at ALMAC [Army Logistics Management Course] now at Fort Lee. Take the time; take two or three days; go to ALMAC. Let's make that part of the pre-command course if you are going to be an installation commander.

The environment programs right now, I think, for installation commanders are extremely important. By the way, you can be personally sued. Not the Army, but you personally sued as the commander if you don't know what the hell you are doing. So I think it behooves us to go and find out.

The major concerns were the DEH [Directorate of Engineering and Housing], the financial management, and how we interfaced with the corps in that regard. Our barracks are crumbling; they are very old. On the outside they look great, on the inside we are dealing with 1950s barracks. With today's caliber of soldiers and trying to keep those great young Americans in the service, and yet not providing them with a place that is compatible with what we ask of them, is a major concern.

I reviewed all the projects that were underway and made sure that they made sense from a priority prospective.

I looked at the organizations of the garrison staff. I found in the Director of Logistics and the Directorate of Engineering and Housing areas what I thought was fairly significant multilayering. We had supervisors supervising supervisors, supervising other supervisors, and eventually it would get down to a carpenter, or a painter, or a mechanic, somebody who was doing the real work. I was motivated by the RIF [reduction in forces] that we were told to undertake in civilian work force, but really seizing on that as an opportunity to do some organizational realignment, we did a scrub of all of our garrison entities. I set up a parameter that said any situation where you have more than two layers of supervision -- overwatching somebody that is actually doing real work -- has to come to me for an adjudication. We flattened out those organizations a good bit.

The flexibility that you have at the installation level is directly proportional to the number of people you have employed. So, the flexibility that you have to fix things is minimal.

In my own heart, I knew that we were bloated at the mid-manager level. Every time a reduction in force came down, we chopped out the bottom. So you just got heavier and heavier at the mid-management level at the GS-9 and up.

I put two or three people together and came up with a reorganization plan. We took one or two analysts working with the garrison commander directly. They redesigned the installation. Then we went back to the directors and said, "This is the way we have reorganized your directory." The program was to flatten out the organization and reorganize it to meet a requirement versus salami-slicing the organization.

You just have to roll up your sleeves and say we are going to do it. In some cases, we just did it.

The thing that I was concerned about was making sure that the work force and the local community understood what we were doing.

I told all the senior leadership that we have an opportunity now to make some changes through this RIF that the Department of the Army and the DOD [Department of Defense] are going through to fix our civilian personnel system. It is the most archaic, bureaucratic, regulation-ridden system that I have ever seen. Quite frankly, the way around all of that is contracting. With contracting, you can manipulate the contracts; you can manipulate the number of people you employ; and you can have a more responsive system. So if the government doesn't do something about their civilian employment system, you are going to find the installation commanders who know how to get around the system by contracting out. I am just concerned that we do something about this while we have the opportunity to do it. It is a bankrupt system.

We have set up a job replacement center.

The bottom line, however, is that I am not being provided the money to sustain the work force that I currently have.

The division commander today has 53 cents on the dollar compared to my predecessor five years ago for BASOPS [Base Operating Information System] and training.

There needs to be some training on the whole directorate of engineering and housing piece. Associated with that is the environmental piece, because the division commander will find that he has a tremendous amount of his budget that is directed toward environmental work. The third piece is comptrollership.

Installation management, maybe something like 50 percent of my time is spent in something other than purely readiness of the division issues.

The relationship of the local communities to this post and the requirement to tend to that relationship carefully and to nurture it is one that I spend a lot of time on, perhaps more than I had expected to spend.

Each environmental concern makes it a challenge to uphold but not make the soldier the endangered species in all of this business. The real challenge in the environmental area is to maintain this post as a major training area for a major division and as the launch pad for that division. To do that in a fashion that is environmentally mature and responsible is difficult.

I think the housing adequacy and availability, the family housing equation, is probably the most long-term significant piece.

The installation commander has to view the installation as the launch platform where the division lives, works, does its business, but from which you can deploy to fight. He also simultaneously has to envision what is going to be left in this place after you go off to fight, and he has to have that system in place.

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